Public, private not-for-profit (PNFP) and private for-profit (PFP) hospitals may have different behaviour and performance in different indicators such as health outcomes, cost-efficiency and quality. Chile has a mixed healthcare system both in financing and service delivery. The public National Health Fund (Fondo Nacional de Salud) covers 76% of the population-poorer and with higher health risks-whereas private health insurers cover 16% of the population-richer and with lower health risks. The aim of the study was to analyse the in-patient mortality outcomes by hospital ownership in Chile. Methods: We use hospital discharge data in Chile for the period 2001-10 with a total of 16 205 314 discharges in 20 public, 6 PNFP and 15 PFP hospitals. We analyse in-patient mortality considering all diagnoses and a subsample considering only myocardial infarction and stroke diagnoses. Using a probit regression, we estimate how hospital ownership explains in-patient mortality controlling for other confounding variables like health and socioeconomic status, and hospital characteristics. Results: The discharge condition was reported as death in 3.5% of the public hospitals' discharges, 1.3% in PNFP and 0.7% in PFP. PNFP and PFP hospitals show a lower risk of in-hospital mortality for all diagnoses, myocardial infarction and stroke in comparison with public hospitals. Discussion: The question about which type of hospital ownership performs better in Chile remains open. Policy decisions regarding health service provision requires more evidence explaining differences by ownership. Better controls for health risk and hospital characteristics are suggested to address these differences in hospital performance.
Introduction
In theory, the behaviour of public, private not-for-profit (PNFP) and private for-profit (PFP) hospitals may differ (Sloan 2000) . The discussion on differences in hospital performance by type of ownership has important implications on policy decisions in the midst of health reforms that aim at improving equity of the health system. There is agreement in the literature that adequate state stewardship and oversight of these mixed systems is necessary (Saltman and Ferroussier-Davis 2000; Lagomarsino et al. 2009 ), which in turn requires a better understanding of the performance of each subsector.
Different authors have argued in favour of one type of ownership regarding their compared expected performance. For example, some assert that PFP are more cost-efficient, better managed and have more capacity to raise capital and expand facilities (Gray 1986; Jaspen 1998) . Other authors argue that PNFP are more efficient since they have lower overall administrative costs, tax benefits, better access to subsidized loans and pay lower Chief Executive Officer (CEO) salaries (Donovan 1997; Lawrence 1997) . Finally, some authors argue that public providers perform better because they have a social welfare goal, which should result in a more equitable and coordinated system (Shen et al. 2007) .
There is more empirical evidence comparing performance across providers' ownership in high-income countries, but there is some evidence from low-and middle-income countries. The performance measure in the literature varies across studies including patient health outcomes, quality of care, accessibility and financial results. Patient health outcomes is explored in two systematic reviews (Berendes et al. 2011; Basu et al. 2012) and their results are not conclusive regarding which type of ownership performs better. Both studies consider PFP and PNFP jointly as private sector, although their performances may significantly differ depending on their regulatory context (Devereaux et al. 2002) . Basu et al. (2012) find that public sector provision is associated with higher rates of treatment success for tuberculosis, HIV and vaccination. They also find that rapid and extensive privatization tends to worsen health system performance. Montagu et al. (2011) perform a metaanalysis of 15 studies that shows that patients in a private healthcare setting are less likely to die than patients in a public healthcare setting [odds ratio (OR): 0.60; 95% confidence interval (CI): 0.41-0.88]. Also, their pooled analysis shows that patients in a private facility are more likely to have unsuccessfully completed tuberculosis (TB) treatment than patients in a public facility (OR 2.04; 95% CI: 1.07-3.89). Shen et al. (2007) perform a systematic review comparing the effects of ownership on financial performance and find that 9 out of 17 studies showed that PNFP hospitals had lower costs than PFP hospitals and only 4 of them had the opposite finding. Likewise, the review finds that seven out of nine US national studies stated that PFP hospitals were less efficient than PNFP hospitals. Devereaux et al. (2004) perform a metaanalysis with eight observational studies, involving more than 350 000 patients, which shows that PFP hospitals are associated with higher payments for care (relative payments for care 1.19, 95% CI: 1.07-1.33, P ¼ 0.001).
In sum, the literature shows that there are differences in performance-using different types of performance measuresacross the three types of ownership. In a higher middle-income country like Chile, these differences could have important policy implications to the extent that its health system provision is segmented.
The Chilean context
Chile has a mixed healthcare system both in financing and in service delivery (Becerril-Montekio et al. 2011) . The public insurer, the National Health Fund [Fondo Nacional de Salud (FONASA), for its acronym in Spanish], covers 76% of the population; the Instituciones de Salud Previsional (ISAPRE) private for-profit insurers cover 17% of the population (FONASA 2013) and the Armed Forces has their own public health system covering 4% of the population. The remaining 3% of the populations does not have health insurance or was in transit from one system to another.
Workers pay a mandatory minimum contribution of 7% of their income to purchase health insurance coverage from ISAPREs or FONASA, with a cap to the monthly contribution of US$200. If individuals choose FONASA, their health coverage is uniform and associated with the public sector capacity. If instead they choose an ISAPRE, they must also choose how much coverage to purchase (benefit package or health plan) where premiums are set based on coverage and health risks, and thus the contribution may exceed the mandatory 7% (Cid 2011a ). In addition, there is a non-for-profit parallel system that gives protection to workers for the job-related accidents and diseases. Around 2.5 million of workers are affiliated to this system through their employer (either public or private). In practice, higher risk and poorest people are covered by FONASA and the lower risk and richest by ISAPREs (Cid 2011b) .
The distribution of health insurance coverage is closely linked to the choice of health service providers. The public sector is the largest provider with over 190 hospitals and around 2000 primary care facilities throughout the country (DEIS 2014). FONASA beneficiaries receive care in this sector, but they can also opt out and receive subsidized care in private facilities, usually with a co-payment that varies by provider. FONASA's opting out mechanism is called 'free choice modality' and it represents less than 11% of the FONASA budget (DIPRES 2013) .
In 2011, the Clinics Association of Chile (2012) reported that the private sector had 83 hospitals (for-profit) and 27 hospitals of the workers' insurance system (not-for-profit). In 2009, the public sector had 27 245 hospital beds (69% of the total), private hospitals had 6101 beds (15%) and the workers' system hospitals had 952 beds (2%). Table 1 lists some of the key differences between hospitals by ownership in Chile. Distribution of earnings and tax treatment differs for PFP and PNFP. PFP pay income and corporate taxes but have more flexibility with their surplus, whereas PNFP is exempt from corporate taxes but cannot redistribute its surplus to owners.
Chile's regulatory context differentiates incentives by ownership that could affect their behaviour and performance. Also, because Chile has a segmented and fragmented health service system, the differences in performance across providers could exacerbate inequities in health outcomes. These two issues motivate the analysis of performance by types of ownership. To date, we have no knowledge of any research in this area in Chile. The aim of this study is to analyse the performance by hospital ownership using as a performance measure in-patient mortality, which is available in the data.
Methods Data
We use data of discharged patients from hospitals in Chile between the years 2001 and 2010 collected by the Department of Health Statistics and Information of the Ministry of Health of Chile. The discharge dataset includes the hospital's code. Using these codes we imputed its teaching status and the number of beds. The complete dataset includes 16 205 314 discharges. We select only hospitals with 50 or more beds for hospitalization, because smaller hospitals' outcomes are likely to be biased by one or a few cases (Ash et al. 2012) . We included retrospective records of 20 public hospitals, 6 PNFP and 15 PFP hospitals representing 36.43% of the total discharges in the country between 2001 and 2010. As well as using all the discharge data, we also select a subsample based on two medical conditions: myocardial infarction and stroke. We select these diagnoses because they represent a large part of hospital admissions in the country, and the severity of the illness is unlikely to be known for these diagnoses by an individual prior to its occurrence (Lien et al. 2008) .
Econometric analyses
We analyse key descriptive statistics of the data and samples used. We compare the dependent variable and the control variables by ownership to understand the differences of patient and provider characteristics.
We use a health outcome (discharge condition) as a hospital performance measure, as suggested by Murray and Frenk (2000) . We study the determinants of in-patient mortality using a specification for a binary dependent variable where 0 means that the patient was 'alive at discharge' and 1 was 'dead at discharge'. The following equation shows the specification used:
where, P : probability of being dead at discharge Z i : independent variables for discharge i n i : error Our explanatory variable of interest is hospital's type of ownership. We use indicator variables for PNFP and PFP, and public hospitals as a base.
We also control for patient characteristics-health status, socioeconomic status and access to care-and the available hospital characteristics-teaching hospital status, size (number of beds) and level of competitiveness. The independent variables used in the analysis are described below:
(a) Patient clinical complexity index (PCCI): We estimate a patients' clinical complexity index based on a previous study that used the information from two public hospitals to implement Diagnostic-Related Groups system for several years (Cid et al. 2009 ). It estimated the parameters of an equation to calculate the PCCI according to a patient's age, gender, length of stay, primary diagnosis and whether or not it had surgery during the in-hospital stay. On the basis of these parameters, we estimate the PCCI of each discharged patient using the following formula: number of beds: less than 100, between 100 and 300, between 300 and 500 and more than 500. We include indicator variables for each group, excluding hospitals with less than 100 beds. Bigger hospitals are usually expected to be more specialized and to provide better quality of care, reducing death risk at discharge. (g) Competition: We include an indicator for hospitals considered to be in competition. All private hospitals were considered to be in competition. We use FONASA's free choice modality to indicate whether a public hospital was in competition. Whenever the occurrence of free choice modality was higher than 12% among all the types of payments made by FONASA to hospitals in the geographic area correspondent to a particular public hospital, it was classified as being in competition. We used the 12% threshold because it is the average payments made through the free choice modality by FONASA at the national level. Competition is expected to drive hospitals to improve their performance.
The socioeconomic status and health status change among hospital ownership type in Chile. Lower income patients have FONASA coverage and their care is restricted to public providers. The population with high health risks are also more likely to have FONASA coverage, although they will only be restricted to public providers if they have low income. Hence, we included socioeconomic and health status variables as controls for these confounding problems.
We estimate this specification using a maximum likelihood probit model with robust standard errors.
We hypothesize that public hospitals are underfunded and over demanded to an extent that their performance could be interpreted as being worse than that of private hospitals. We try to control for the higher risk patients that seek care in public hospitals, but PCCI may only be capturing part of the differences because it is based on coefficients estimated using only two public hospitals. We would expect that PFP hospitals have higher access to better equipment that should reduce the probability of death at discharge in comparison to both PNFP and public hospitals. Table 2 lists the descriptive statistics of the variables included for all health conditions. On average, more discharges end in death in public hospitals, followed by PNFP and PFP. Public hospitals have on average older patients, more women, longer stays, higher PCCI, patients living in rural areas, greater distance to major hospitals and more teaching activities. In terms of type of coverage, 42.4% of the public hospital discharges were of FONASA A group (low income), whereas in PNFP, 71.8% were from ISAPRES (high income) and in PFP, 87.2% were from ISAPRES. Finally, 64% of public hospital discharges were in hospitals with more than 500 beds, whereas in PNFP, 37.7% were in hospitals with 301-500 beds and in PFP with 101-300 beds. Table 3 lists the behaviour of the death rate and PCCI over time. The death rate has an increasing trend in public hospitals as well as an increasing trend in its patients' clinical complexity, indicating a positive correlation between these two variables. The same happens with PNFP and PFP, although in the case of PFP, the PCCI is decreasing as well as the death rate. Table 4 lists the same statistics for the subsample of patients diagnosed with myocardial infarction and/or stroke. There is an important difference in discharges that end in death by type of ownership in this subsample. In public hospitals, 14.3% of the discharges end in death, whereas in PNFP and PFP, these percentages are about three times lower (4.5% and 4.0%, respectively). These diagnoses are higher risk than average, so differences are greater than the observed for the sample with all the diagnoses. 
Results

Owners of hospitals
Private economic groups commonly organized as holdings with investments in other healthcare industries but also in other sectors through investment funds.
Boards related to universities and groups affiliated to labour or entrepreneurs unions, in this case affected to the law of job-related accidents and diseases.
Government owned
Right of surplus distribution
Can distribute all profits (net revenues less expenses) to owners.
Cannot distribute surplus to those who control the organization (i.e. board of directors, administrators and doctors).
If there is any surplus it is returned to the central government.
Tax treatmentpersonal/ corporate income tax
Owners of hospitals have to pay personal income tax from earnings and corporate tax
Exempted from corporate tax unless they use the social contributions for other purposes than the one stated in their mission.
No taxes applicable.
Sources of capital Equity capital from establishers, debt, retained earnings.
Charitable contributions, debt, retained earnings.
Government funding.
Composition of revenue
Sale of labour and services. Sale of labour and services, and from charitable contributions.
Source: Authors.
As in the case of all diagnoses, public hospitals tend to have patients that are older, more women, lower income (measured as their health coverage group), more who live in rural areas and hence face longer distances to the main hospital. From the point of view of provision, public hospitals report longer stays and are less likely to perform surgical interventions. The lower likelihood of performing surgical interventions could show differences in the production function between public hospitals and PNFP and PFP hospitals, where the latter have access to more or better technology. Table 5 lists the results of the probit models. When considering all the diagnoses, the risk of the hospital stay ending in death is lower in PNFP and PNP relative to public hospitals, and more so for PFP. As expected, the patients' clinical complexity index coefficient is positive and statistically significant, increasing the risk of death. Hospital size dummies are only statistically significant for the 301-500 beds group and 501 or more beds group. In the first group, size of the hospital tends to decrease the likelihood of death, whereas in the second group, it increases the likelihood. The number of beds could be considered as a proxy of the volume and specialization of hospitals. Hence, the 301-500 seem to reflect more specialized hospitals, which have been shown to have superior outcomes and therefore higher quality.
Results of the econometric models
For myocardial infarction and stroke, almost all the explanatory variables are statistically significant with the exception of the size group dummies. The dummies for type of property are both statistically significant and with negative coefficients. This means that both the PNFP and PFP hospital decrease the death risk relative to the public hospital. PNFP hospitals appear to decrease the death risk by more than PFP hospitals, but the difference is not statistically significant.
For this subgroup of diagnoses, the patients' clinical complexity index switches sign and decreases in magnitude, which may seem counterintuitive. One interpretation is that more complex diagnoses are generally found in more complex facilities which in turn have greater problem-solving capacity. Because there are no proxy variables controlling for the problem-solving capacity of the hospitals, the patients' clinical complexity index could be absorbing part of this variance.
The type of health coverage, which could be interpreted as an income proxy, shows that higher incomes have lower death risks. The year dummies also show a negative correlation with death risk, which increases in time and could be reflecting the natural decrease in mortality rates.
Discussion
The question about which type of ownership performs better in Chile remains open. Although raw data tends to show better performance in the private sector, it is still unclear if this is due to the higher health risks and lower resources in public providers. Therefore, any policy decisions regarding health sector reform in terms of the provision of care should include a permanent assessment of the provision of care.
The results seem to suggest that using in-patient mortality requires the availability of more control variables, in particular, of hospital characteristics. In addition, there are key system components that could not be included in this analysis. For example, medical doctors in Chile tend to work in both sectors, public and private. Working in public hospitals tends to be linked to prestige and altruism, while working in private hospitals provides significantly better pay, which in the end moves doctors to the latter sector. This arrangement may imply that differences across ownership may be more related to the better position of the private sector to compete for doctors than an under-financed public sector.
Both PNFP and PFP have lower death rates when compared with public hospitals. Although the model controls by some risk factors and provider characteristics, there are other factors, which we could not adjust for or that may not be appropriately controlled for. First, the PCCI used may not be capturing the real level of complexity, particularly, for private hospitals because it was estimated using information from only two complex public hospitals of Santiago. If public hospitals provide service to lower income populations that have higher health risks, then the patients' clinical complexity index may be overestimating the level of complexity of patients seeking care in PNFP and PFP hospitals where higher income and lower health risk populations seek care. Second, there are no data available on follow-up after discharge. Sloan et al. (2003) and Lien et al. (2008) study performance considering 30-60 days or a year after discharge. More private hospital patients may be choosing to be discharged to spend their final days at home in comparison to public hospital patients, which mean that the death rate among private providers is actually higher than the one in the data. Third, we do not control for resource intensity Source: Authors. *P < 0.1. **P < 0.05. ***P < 0.01. by type of ownership, which could explain the likelihood of a discharge ending in death (Mukamel et al. 2001) . The resources available for private hospitals are significantly higher than for public hospitals, which could in turn translate in more sophisticated and advanced production functions compared with public providers. And fourth, more severely ill patients could be directed to public hospitals as they come from lower socioeconomic settings and their health status at the entrance to the hospital is worse. The distance variable only partially captures this effect. This is a first attempt to study the differences in hospital behaviour by type of ownership in Chile. Hospital ownership should be considered in future research in low-and middleincome countries, especially, in the Latin American region where there is not much research on this topic. Latin American countries have fragmented healthcare provision systems where regulation tends to exacerbate differences by type of ownership, as in the case of Chile. Understanding the differences could be useful for policy decisions regarding the financing and provision of healthcare services in these countries.
